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FAMILY LAW—EGG DONATION AND STEM CELL RESEARCH—EGGS FOR 
SALE: THE SCRAMBLED STATE OF LEGISLATION IN THE HUMAN EGG 
MARKET 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world has seen the rapid rise of numerous medical technologies 
that were outside the realm of possibility just a few decades ago.1 These 
developing technologies, although generally providing incredible enhance-
ment to our lives, have also created an equally incredible legal tangle.2 Cou-
ples who would never have had children in earlier times are now able to 
reproduce with the help of science—and a host of doctors, donors, and mid-
dlemen who are involved in the process.3 A survey of existing legislation 
reveals a glaring disparity in how human eggs4 are currently regulated in the 
United States depending on the purpose for which they are used.5 Human 
eggs are harvested and used for two purposes: reproduction and research 
(stem-cell and human cloning); both of which must essentially compete for 
eggs from a small pool of willing donors.6 Egg donors7 are compensated 
very differently depending on the intended use for their eggs: donors for 
reproductive purposes may receive substantial compensation, whereas egg 
  
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See infra Part II; see also SCOTT CARNEY, THE RED MARKET 113 (2011). “The busi-
ness features well-meaning doctors alongside assembly-line charlatans, desperate parents, 
and unlikely entrepreneurs, all competing for one source of raw materials: women of 
childbearing age.” Id.  
 4. BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 480 (42d ed. 2010). A human egg or oocyte is “[a]n 
immature ovum.” Id. See also ASSESSING THE MEDICAL RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION 
FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP REPORT, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL 14 (Linda Giudice, Eileen Santa & Robert Pool, eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
IOM Report] (explaining that “[w]hen a baby girl is born, her ovaries contain roughly 2 mil-
lion oocytes, each encased in a protective covering called a follicle”). “At the time of a wom-
an’s first menstrual period, she still has 400,000 or so of these primordial follicles, and by the 
time of menopause they are almost all gone . . .” Id. 
 5. See infra Appendix A: Fifty State Survey of Egg Donation, Stem-Cell, and Human 
Cloning Legislation [hereinafter Fifty State Survey]. Westlaw search criteria: ova or egg or 
oocyte /p compensation; oocyte /p consideration; “human egg” /p consideration or compensa-
tion; embryo & “stem cell” or “human cloning.” 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. The word “donor” is misleading because it implies a charitable gift. See Thomas 
Murray, New Reproductive Technologies and the Family, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES 
51, 64 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996) (“Despite the repeated references to donors of both 
ovum and sperm, paying individuals for their biological products makes them vendors, not 
donors,” thus placing “the interactions between the parties squarely in the marketplace.”). 
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donors for research generally do not receive any compensation.8 Existing 
legislation reflects a prevalent unwillingness to condone payment for eggs 
used for research, particularly human cloning, because large quantities of 
human embryos are manipulated and destroyed in the research process.9 The 
public’s repugnance toward human cloning, often motivated by misconcep-
tions or individual moral viewpoints, has resulted in a crazy quilt of state 
and national legislation that gives bad actors wide latitude to engage in im-
proper or unethical treatment of both donors and recipients of donor eggs.10 
Few states have enacted legislation to protect egg donors; there are no 
systematic regulations to ensure that donors and recipients are fully in-
formed about the risks of the egg harvesting procedures—which are consid-
erable—and, consequently, there is little case law to provide guidance to 
courts in fashioning a remedy.11 Mounting evidence shows that the egg- 
harvesting procedure is far riskier than was previously thought and can 
cause women to suffer serious complications, including ovarian torsion, 
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, massive fluid build-up in the abdominal 
cavity, miscarriages, blood clots, stroke, sterility, renal failure, and death, 
causing many clinicians and commentators to question whether it is even 
possible for donors to give “informed consent.”12 These complications are 
particularly alarming in light of the fact that donors are chosen because they 
are in good health prior to donation.13 
Although commentators have examined various legal, moral, and ethi-
cal issues involved with eggs used for reproductive purposes or for stem cell 
research, the intertwined relationship between these markets has largely 
been ignored.14 Many commentators now agree that the long-term risks to 
  
 8. See infra Part II.D. 
 9. See infra Part II.D and Part III.A; see also Ronald Chester & Robert Sackstein, 
Embryonic Stem Cell-Based Therapeutics: Balancing Scientific Progress and Bioethics, 20 
HEALTH MATRIX 203, 207–16 (2010) (analyzing whether “4-6 day old human embryos” used 
in stem-cell and human-cloning research are human beings from various religious, moral, and 
scientific perspectives and discussing the often polarizing controversy surrounding this ques-
tion). 
 10. See infra Part II.D and Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See Simón Marina et al., Oocyte Donor Selection From 554 Candidates, 14 HUMAN 
REPROD. 2770, 2774 (1999) (“[Y]ounger women are more altruistic, have had fewer sexual 
partners, and have a lower risk of venereal disease. According to our experience, the student 
receiving economic compensation is the most suitable donor and the one that recipients ac-
cept best.”); Jennifer Schneider, Fatal Colon Cancer in a Young Egg Donor: A Physician 
Mother’s Call for Follow-up and Research on the Long-term Risks of Ovarian Stimulation, 
90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1.e1, 1.e1 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Lisa Hird Chung, Free Trade in Human Reproductive Cells: A Solution to 
Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 263, 265 (2006); 
Gregory Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J. 1203, 1257 (2009); 
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donors are substantial and that existing regulation is insufficient to protect 
women from exploitation or unethical practices, such as fraud, mishandling 
or destruction of embryos, misrepresentation or deception about the risks 
involved with the harvesting process, egg swapping or stealing, predatory 
advertising, and failure to disclose conflicts of interest.15  
Another growing concern is that providers and clinics often outsource 
the recruitment of donors to independent egg brokers who are not subject to 
ethical guidelines.16 Because independent egg brokers and egg donor agen-
cies are not clinics or physicians, they are not required to join a professional 
organization that provides ethical guidelines for appropriate conduct, such 
as the American Medical Association (AMA), American Society of Repro-
ductive Medicine (ASRM), or the Society for Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology (SART).17 For this reason, these entities are able to bypass regula-
tions, and the providers or clinics that utilize their services are not directly 
tainted by ethical or fraudulent activity.18  
  
Pamela Foohey, Paying Women for Their Eggs for Use in Stem Cell Research, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 900, 903 (2010); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of 
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 603 (2003); J. Brad Reich & Dawn 
Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg 
Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2010); O. Carter Snead, 
Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1530 
(2010); Ann Bindu Thomas, Avoiding Embryos “R” Us: Toward a Regulated Fertility Indus-
try, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 247 (2008); Andrew Zacher, Oocyte Donor Compensa-
tion for Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Analysis of New York’s “Payment for Eggs Pro-
gram,” 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 323, 323 (2011). 
 15. See, e.g., Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics, 
and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation To Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 193, 194 (2008); Rev. Phillip C. Cato, The Hidden Costs of Fertility, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. 
LEG. COMMENT. 45, 53 (2005); Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 188 (2011); M. Elliott Neal, Protecting Women: Preserving 
Autonomy in the Commodification of Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 611, 616 
(2011); Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building A Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 41, 41 (2009); Lisa M. Luetkemeyer, Comment, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse 
and What Are They Doing with the Eggs (and Sperm)? A Call for Increased Regulation of 
Gamete Donation and Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 397, 399 (2010); Yaniv Heled, Note, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated 
Reproductive Tissue—The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
243, 267 (2010). 
 16. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Lahl, President, The Center for Bioethics and 
Culture Network (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 17. See infra note 22 and accompanying text; Melissa Reynolds, Note, How Old Is Too 
Old?: The Need for Federal Regulation Imposing A Maximum Age Limit on Women Seeking 
Infertility Treatments, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 277, 293 (2010). 
 18. E.g., Mark Hansen, . . . and Baby Makes Litigation: As Surrogacy Becomes More 
Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, 97 A.B.A. J. 52, 56 (Mar. 2011) (reporting on one of 
the biggest fertility scandals). 
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In addition, there is little information or scholarly research exploring 
the growing role that fertility clinics, egg-donation agencies, and private 
brokers play in shaping the market for human eggs within the United 
States.19 Currently, only one state—California—directly regulates fertility 
clinics,20 supporting the conclusion that “supervising certain commercial 
aspects of the fertility industry” has “generally . . . escaped the sustained 
attention of federal and state officials.”21 This conclusion is further support-
ed by the lack of case law arising from donors who suffered serious compli-
cations or were subjected to unethical practices,22 despite increasing evi-
dence demonstrating the frequency at which these complications occur.23 
Some commentators theorize that one reason providers choose to engage in 
unethical behavior, whether directly or indirectly (through brokers or agen-
cies), is because the guidelines put forth by the ASRM are not mandatory, 
and there are no penalties for failure to comply, with the exception of Cali-
fornia.24 
This article presents a compelling argument that comprehensive legis-
lation addressing the procurement of human eggs used for research and re-
  
 19. See Lahl, supra note 16.  
 20. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at California; see also Cato, supra note 15, at 
49  (citing Stacey A. Huse, The Need for Regulation in the Fertility Industry, 35 U. OF 
LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 555, 558 (1996/97)). 
 21. See Noah, supra note 14, at 616. 
 22. Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of 
Oocyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CTR. R. 25, 28–33 (2010) (discussing evidence that egg donor 
agencies do not comply with ASRM guidelines for donor compensation). 
 23. See infra Part II. There are several reasons for these complications. Donors who 
experience serious complications may be paid to settle in order to avoid negative publicity or 
jeopardizing the physician’s medical license. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Damages at 
1, Papademas v. Pac. Fertility Med. Grp. (No. 315913), 2002 WL 34141522, at *1 (Cal. 
Super. 2002) [hereinafter Papademas]; see also H. Mertes & G. Pennings, Oocyte Donation 
for Stem Cell Research, 22 HUM. REPROD. 629, 633 (2007) (reporting studies where “mal-
practices ranging from denying a promised anesthesia during oocyte retrieval and denying 
follow-up care to intimidation by physicians and the absence of informed consent”). Donors 
who experience significant side effects, but not serious enough to encourage settlement, often 
face an uphill battle to win a medical malpractice action against the physician and fertility 
clinic that treated them. See, e.g., Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
146, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (detailing an egg-stealing scandal where doctors stole 
eggs/pre-embryos from over three hundred victims); Dubont v. Cornell Univ., No. G026598, 
2002 WL 536020, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2002); Stone v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 92 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (outlining charges of egg stealing against two fertil-
ity doctors; one was later arrested in Mexico after fleeing the United States to avoid arrest). It 
is often very difficult for medical malpractice actions to succeed. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo 
Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 24. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2; Levine, supra note 22, at 25–33. For a review 
of ASRM guidelines currently in place, see ASRM Ethics Committee Reports & Statements, 
http://www.asrm.org/EthicsReports/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); ASRM Practice Committee 
Guidelines, http://www.asrm.org/Guidelines/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).  
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productive purposes is needed within the United States to protect women 
from exploitation and unethical practices.25 Currently, many states have ei-
ther no legislative guidelines in place or only address eggs used for research 
purposes, while remaining silent on eggs used for reproductive purposes.26 
No state has yet enacted comprehensive legislation addressing eggs used for 
both research and reproductive purposes.27 Because this topic is complex 
and uses a specialized vocabulary and concepts that are not part of common 
knowledge, Part II discusses Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) pro-
cedures that are being used and the demand for these procedures that is cur-
rently shaping the global market for human eggs.  
Part III presents an overview of the current inadequate state legislation 
regarding eggs used both for research and for reproductive purposes in all 
fifty states, and it analyzes the existing gaps. This overview will focus on six 
critical problems: disparate compensation based on the intended use of the 
eggs, lack of informed consent, conflicts of interest, predatory advertising, 
donor-screening procedures, and the disposition of surplus or leftover eggs. 
The scope of this note is limited to current legislative approaches taken 
among the fifty states and does not discuss regulatory oversight by federal 
agencies or federal regulations that have largely been ineffective in address-
ing these problems within the fertility industry, due to lack of enforcement.28 
While federal regulation may be desirable and certainly would be the most 
comprehensive solution, the Supreme Court of the United States has histori-
cally shown a clear preference for allowing the states to experiment and try 
to hammer out a solution.29 Part IV examines possible legislative solutions, 
and Part V offers recommendations. 
  
 25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See id. 
 28. For an overview of existing agencies, regulations, or associations that monitor vari-
ous aspects of the ART industry see Bercovici, supra note 15, at 198–202; Heled, supra note 
15, at 267–80; Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 23–30.  
 29. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “one of the happy incidents of the federal system” was that a state 
could “serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments”); see also Gon-
zales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 
(1993)) (discussing “the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core police powers have 
always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare 
of their citizens.”). 
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II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
The number of children conceived using donated reproductive tissue 
continues to rise substantially every year.30 Assisted reproductive technolo-
gies (ART) encompass a number of procedures such as in vitro fertilization 
(IVF), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), gamete intrafallopian transfer 
(GIFT), and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI).31 The Centers for Dis-
ease Prevention and Control (CDC) defines ART as “all clinical treatments 
and laboratory procedures—including the handling of human oocytes and 
sperm, or embryos—conducted with the intent of conceiving.”32 ART does 
not refer to “treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., artificial in-
semination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to stimu-
late egg production without the intention of having eggs retrieved.”33 Ap-
proximately twelve percent of all ART cycles performed in the United 
States use donated eggs.34  
ART is highly desirable because it gives infertile couples the ability to 
conceive a genetic child using donated eggs.35 The term “genetic children” 
refers to the use of at least one parent’s genetic material (whether sperm or 
eggs) in the reproduction process, as opposed to an adopted child that has no 
  
 30. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that “[i]n 2009, there 
were 441 reporting clinics that performed 146,244 cycles, which resulted in 45,870 live 
births, and 60,190 infants” and “over 1% of all infants born in the U.S. every year are con-
ceived using ART”). See also Appendix B: Glossary of Terms Used in This Report, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2008/appixb.htm#L (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter CDC Glossary]. The CDC Glossary defines an ART cycle as “a 
process in which (1) an ART procedure is performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian 
stimulation or monitoring with the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos 
have been thawed with the intent of transferring them to a woman.” Id. “A cycle begins when 
a woman begins taking fertility drugs or having her ovaries monitored for follicle produc-
tion.” Id. A “live birth” is defined as “the delivery of one or more infants with any signs of 
life.” Id. 
 31. Infertility FAQ’s, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Infertility/index.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).  
 32. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30. 
 33. See Jonathan B. Pitt, Fragmenting Procreation, 108 YALE L.J. 1893, 1893–97 
(1999). 
 34. 2009 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates National Summary and Fer-
tility Clinic Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 60 (2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/PDF/ART_2009_Full.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ART Report].  
 35. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inal-
ienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 106–07 (1999) 
(discussing the importance our society places upon genetic offspring). 
2012] EGGS FOR SALE 195 
biological relation to its adopted parents.36 For many people, the ability to 
pass on their heritage or personal characteristics to their children is extreme-
ly important.37   
ART’s increasing popularity over the last thirty years38 is due to a 
number of cultural factors, such as society’s tendency to place increasing 
importance on achieving educational goals and career progression.39 Many 
women choose to wait until after age thirty-five to have children.40 Because 
of this delay, the demand for ART technology has grown exponentially.41 
Aided by the evolution of reproductive and personal privacy rights,42 it is 
now possible for women to exercise greater control over their reproductive 
destinies.43  
Although the Constitution protects the fundamental right to procreate, 
constitutional scholars are uncertain how the contours and limitations of this 
right will evolve in the context of stem cell research, human cloning, in vitro 
fertilization, and egg donation.44 Much will depend upon how the “principle 
of procreative liberty” is interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States and whether the use of ART technology is entitled to “special consti-
  
 36. See Suchitra Jittaun Satpathi, Gliding Over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillment and Re-
sponsibility in the New Reproductive Era; Why Contractual Ordering Is Appropriate, 18 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 58 (1999). 
 37. See Coleman, supra note 35, at 107.  
 38. See 2009 ART Report, supra note 34, at 65 (reporting that the number of ART cycles 
performed in the U.S. increased over forty-six percent from 2000 to 2009). 
 39. Bradley J. Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 379, 379 
(2007); see also Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential Progeny, Pater-
nity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 857, 865–66 (2007). 
 40. Kara N. Maxwell, Ina N. Cholst, & Zev Rosenwalks, The Incidence of Both Serious 
and Minor Complications in Young Women Undergoing Oocyte Donation, 90 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 2165, 2165 (2008); see also Linda J. Heffner, Advanced Maternal Age–How Old is 
Too Old? 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927, 1927 (2004). 
 41. See 2009 ART Report, supra note 34, at 65 (ART Trends 2000–2009). 
 42. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (holding that 
“[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procre-
ation, contraception, family relationships . . . .”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1942) (upholding a fundamental right to procreate). 
 43. See J. McGregor & F. Dreifuss-Netter, France and the United States: The Legal and 
Ethical Differences in Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), 26 MED. & L. 117, 117 
(2007). 
 44. See Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Constitution, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57, 62 (2002); see also John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, 
Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 
1490–1505 (2008). 
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tutional protection.”45 As Professor Coleman remarked, “[u]ltimately, 
whether ART should be considered part of procreative liberty is as much 
about values and policy as it is about precedent.”46 The paucity of case law, 
combined with the lack of legislative guidance in most states, is one factor 
contributing to the rise of unethical behavior by some practitioners within 
the fertility industry.47 
A. The Global Egg Market 
In many developing countries, the lack of regulation and extreme pov-
erty has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of fertility clinics 
and brokers that cater to foreigners searching for IVF treatments.48 The 
global market for human eggs has grown exponentially as in vitro fertiliza-
tion and stem cell technologies have become more widely available, creating 
a “global shortage of human [oocytes].”49 The expansion of the global mar-
ketplace has created increased opportunities to exploit women, while exert-
ing pressure on the market for eggs within the United States.50  
1. The Internet: New Opportunities for Reproductive Commerce 
Increased mobility, unprecedented access to the Internet, and the inter-
national focus on globalization has led to significant opportunities for repro-
ductive commerce.51 Within the fertility industry, the Internet acts as a con-
duit for communication between couples, clinics, and prospective egg do-
nors, whether the couple is considering using a local clinic or traveling out-
  
 45. See Coleman, supra note 44, at 60. “If . . . individuals have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in making decisions about the use of some or all ARTs, any regulation of these 
technologies would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.” Id. “Like all questions about 
the scope of substantive due process protections, the concept of procreative liberty is suscep-
tible to multiple interpretations, depending on the level of generality at which the principle is 
defined.” Id. at 68. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See supra notes 16–18, 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 48. Ruth Saunders and Zeynep Gürtin-Broadbent, Event Review: Making Babies in the 
21st Century—The Rise of Reproductive Technologies, BIONEWS (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_81597.asp (last visited June 8, 2012). 
 49. Catherine Waldby, Oocyte Markets: Women’s Reproductive Work in Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research, 27 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 19, 20 (2008); see also Thomas J. 
Papadimos & Alexa T. Papadimos, The Student and the Ovum: The Lack of Autonomy and 
Informed Consent in Trading Genes for Tuition, 2 REPROD. BIOLOGY & ENDOCRINOLOGY 56, 
61 (2004). 
 50. See generally CARNEY, supra note 3 (discussing the global trade in body parts); see 
also Waldby, supra note 49, at 19.  
 51. See Globalization, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story043/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); see also 
Swink & Reich, supra note 39, at 863–69. 
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side the United States to a country where the costs are lower and the regula-
tions are minimal.52 Clinics use the internet to offer infertile and non-
traditional couples the ability to “customize” a child based on particular 
characteristics, such as height, eye color, hair color, or race.53 Prospective 
recipients can sort through hundreds of donor profiles and pictures—much 
like a dating website.54 Although the process is anonymous, some egg bro-
kers “personalize” the experience by creating profiles for each egg donor 
that lists their ethnicities, religion, eye color, hair color, height, age, build, 
education level, talents, hobbies, location, and whether they have been preg-
nant before.55 The donor profile includes several pictures of the donor in 
various poses, and may also include a video statement by the donor.56 
2. Twin Purposes for Human Eggs 
Worldwide, human eggs are used for two principal purposes: reproduc-
tion (IVF) and research (stem-cell and cloning).57 The procedure for harvest-
ing eggs is essentially the same for both; however, with stem cell research 
the “aim of the donation is to advance medical knowledge rather than to 
establish a pregnancy.”58 Egg donation or oocyte retrieval is a complicated 
multi-step procedure that involves a multi-drug protocol59 with substantial 
acute and long-term risks to both donor and recipient.60  
  
 52. Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet is Reshaping Assisted Reproduc-
tion: From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 11 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 477, 477 (2010). 
 53. Tamara Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 
2010, at C, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703493504576007774155273928.html. 
 54. Prospective parents can add donors to their wish list, much like placing an order on 
Amazon.com, and then the broker will work with the parents to choose their “ideal” donor. 
See, e.g., Braverman, supra note 52, at 477. 
 55. E.g., Egg Donor Wish List: Member Login, THE CTR. FOR HUMAN REPROD., 
https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/wl_search.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); FERTILITY 
BRIDGES, http://www.fertilitybridges.com/eggdonordatabase.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
“Proven” donors are compensated more because the probability that a recipient will become 
pregnant using their eggs is higher. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e1. 
 56. Egg Donor Wish List: Member Login, supra note 55. 
 57. See Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 629. 
 58. Id. (discussing the harvesting procedure for IVF reproduction and stem cell re-
search). 
 59. See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, STANFORD UNIV., 
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/procedures.html (last visited Sept. 
30, 2011). Donors generally receive three classes of drugs before their eggs are harvested: 
Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone Agonist Analogues (GRHA), Follicle Stimulating Hor-
mone (FSH) or Human Menopausal Gonadotropin (hMG), and Human Chorionic Gonado-
tropin (HCG). Id. 
 60. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 4. 
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First, the donor takes a drug to stop ovulation and menstruation, induc-
ing “artificial menopause.”61 Next, the donor begins daily injections of either 
follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) or human menopausal gonadotropin 
(hMG), which hyperstimulates the ovaries to maximize the number of eggs 
produced.62 After the donor’s physician determines that the eggs have ma-
tured, ovulation is triggered by administering a single dose of human chori-
onic gonadotropin.63 Egg retrieval occurs thirty-four to thirty-six hours after 
this injection.64 The donor is placed under anesthesia and her eggs are har-
vested using transvaginal aspiration.65  
B. Risks and Side Effects Associated with Egg Harvesting 
While the long-term risks and effects of egg donation are not yet de-
finitively known, recent studies suggest that the medications used to stop 
ovulation and hyperstimulate the ovaries to produce more eggs (Stages 1 
and 2) expose egg donors to tremendous risks that may endanger their lives 
and compromise their future fertility.66 Within the medical community, there 
is significant disagreement about the frequency at which these risks occur 
and the potential long-term effects the drug protocols may have upon do-
nors’ health and future fertility.67 
  
 61. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 59. This step will hereinafter 
be referred to as Stage 1. A commonly used GRHA is Lupron™ (brand name) or Leuprolide 
acetate (generic), which is indicated (approved) for “palliative treatment of advanced prostat-
ic cancer.” Table of Approved Indications for GnRH Agonists in Adults, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ 
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm209842.htm#table (last visit-
ed Oct. 30, 2011). 
 62. See generally IOM Report, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the harvesting process). 
This step will hereinafter be referred to as Stage 2. 
 63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. This step will hereinafter be referred to as 
Stage 3. 
 64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 65. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
 66. For more information and detailed data findings, see W. Kramer, J. Schneider & N. 
Schultz, US Oocyte Donors: A Retrospective Study of Medical and Psychosocial Issues, 24 
HUMAN REPROD. 3144, 3146 (2009) (noting there are no studies that evaluate the donor’s 
long-term risks after ovarian stimulation and the increased incidences of premature ovarian 
failure, reduced fertility, and cancer). See also IOM Report, supra note 4, at 11–50. 
 67. Compare Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INFO., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0004549/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2012) 
(stating that OHSS is a complication occasionally seen in women), and Repetitive Oocyte 
Donation, PRACTICE COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
S194, S194 (2008) (positing that “[c]ontrolled ovarian hyperstimulation entails both known 
and theoretical risks”), with Christian Jensen, Egg Donation Is Not as Simple as it Sounds, 
EVENING STANDARD (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/lifestyle/article-
24002543-egg-donation-is-not-as-simple-as-it-sounds.do#.Tqrnj_DNNhQ.mailto (discussing 
the occurrence of OHSS and linking it to “intensive farming at fertility clinics”). 
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1. Acute Risks 
Potential acute risks to egg donors include ovarian hyperstimulation 
syndrome (OHSS), anesthesia/surgical mishaps,68 and psychological prob-
lems.69 Some clinicians and practitioners believe that OHSS rarely occurs 
and, when it does, it is likely linked to “pre-disposing factors,” such as poly-
cystic ovarian syndrome or the age of the donor, which cause the donor’s 
ovaries to respond differently to the drug protocols in Stages 1 and 2.70 Oth-
ers believe that acute risks, particularly OHSS, are linked to the aggressive 
stimulation of the ovaries and lack of individualized drug protocols.71 Doc-
tors are often reluctant to cancel or adjust the donor’s drug protocol because 
their “patient” is the recipient, rather than the donor; this conflict of interest 
may negatively affect the quality of care the donor receives.72 According to 
Dr. Suzanne Parisian, former chief medical officer for the Federal Drug 
Administration, 
[O]ver-stimulation of the ovary can progress rapidly to a serious life-
threatening condition days after completion of egg collection . . . OHSS 
carries an increased risk of clotting disorders, kidney damage, and ovari-
an twisting. Ovarian stimulation . . . has been associated with serious life 
threatening pulmonary conditions in FDA trials including thromboem-
bolic events, pulmonary embolism, pulmonary infarction, cerebral vascu-
lar accident (stroke) and arterial occlusion with loss of a limb and death.  
Risks of the egg retrieval procedure, although rare, include death, respir-
  
 68. See Stephen J. Bennett et al., Complications of Transvaginal Ultrasound-Directed 
Follicle Aspiration: A Review of 2670 Consecutive Procedures, 10 J. OF ASSISTED REPROD. & 
GENETICS 72 (1993); Suzanne Parisian, Open Letter from Suzanne Parisian, CENTER FOR 
GENETICS & SOC’Y (Feb. 19, 2005), http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=181. 
 69. IOM Report, supra note 4, at 41–49. 
 70. See Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 630. 
 71. See Annick Delvigne & Serge Rozenberg, Epidemiology and Prevention of Ovarian 
Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS): A Review, 8 HUMAN REPROD. UPDATE 559, 561 (2002) 
(“[A] significant correlation was found between the baseline number of follicles, the number 
of oocytes retrieved, and OHSS. There is no doubt that the incidence of OHSS is related to 
the stimulation regimens used.”). See also Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 630. 
 72. See Delvigne & Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 565 (“[P]hysicians may also feel more 
reluctant to propose cancellation to patients [who receive the harvested eggs] as IVF implies 
a great commitment on the patients’ part in terms of procedures, time and money; moreover, 
the physicians are also under pressure to obtain a ‘successful’ outcome and to transfer more 
embryos when there is no insurance. . . .”); see also Noah, supra note 14, at 626–28 (citing 
W. Gifford-Jones, Multiple Births a Cause for Concern, FIN. POST, Aug. 8, 1998, at R11) 
(suggesting that one reason some practitioners overstimulate the donor’s ovaries is because it 
is more effective (more eggs are produced) and more profitable.). 
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atory or cardiac arrest, brain damage, paraplegia, paralysis, loss of func-
tion of a limb or organ, hemorrhage, allergic reaction, and infection.73 
A number of recent studies suggest that the occurrence of OHSS is 
substantially higher than previously reported,74 and it is directly linked to 
“the total number of developing follicles and to the number of collected 
oocytes.”75 However, experts disagree on the frequency with which OHSS 
occurs, with estimates ranging from less than one percent to nearly thirty 
percent.76 It is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely determine how often 
acute complications result from egg harvesting because providers are not 
required to report incidents of OHSS, and many providers do not follow up 
with the donors after their eggs are harvested.77  
2. Long-term Risks 
Long-term risks of egg donation largely remain a mystery because 
there are no clinical trials that have studied the long-term effects of egg do-
nation upon the donor, suggesting that many donors did not have sufficient 
information to give informed consent.78 Potential long-term side effects cur-
  
 73. Parisian, supra note 68. Accord IOM Report, supra note 4, at 18–19. See also Ovar-
ian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, PRACTICE COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., 90 
FERTILITY & STERILITY S188, S191 (2008); Arthur C. Fleischer, MD, Ovarian Torsion, 
MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/2026938-overview (last up-
dated Sept. 26, 2011) (explaining that “[o]varian torsion is encountered more often in women 
who have had ovarian stimulation”). 
 74. See Kramer et al., supra note 66, at 3146 (reporting on their research efforts survey-
ing 287 donors); see also IOM Report, supra note 4, at 17–22. 
 75. See Delvigne & Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 564 (“[N]o patient developed severe 
OHSS when fewer than 20 oocytes were collected,” but it should be noted that the risk of 
developing OHSS rose substantially when more than thirty oocytes were extracted.); see also 
Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 630; Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, supra note 
73, at S188 (noting that risk rises with number of oocytes retrieved). 
 76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2168 
(noting that the statistics did not include the donors whose cycles were cancelled due to the 
risk of OHSS and that the occurrence of complications was based upon whether or not the 
donor came back for an office visit, suggesting that the risks of OHSS are probably higher 
than reported); see also Kramer et al., supra note 66, at 3146. For example, a recent study 
that surveyed egg donors ten years after their eggs were harvested reported that thirty percent 
of participants reported OHSS complications and nearly ten percent reported infertility is-
sues. See id. 
 77. In some cases, women file medical malpractice suits against the clinic or doctors 
performing the oocyte retrieval and later settle before trial. See, e.g., Papademas, supra note 
23, at *1; Kramer et al., supra note 66, at 3146; Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2168; 
Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 631. 
 78. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2–e3 (“‘Virtually all of the published reports 
have suggested that given time, an association between the exogenous gonadotropins and 
various cancers may eventually be demonstrated” and “[t]here has been little attention fo-
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rently identified include breast, ovarian, and endometrial cancers as well as 
infertility.79 Clinicians’ efforts to demonstrate a link between the drug proto-
cols used and a higher risk of cancer have been stymied by the lack of donor 
data and the high costs associated with managing a large, long-term surveil-
lance program.80 Several studies monitored donors for possible side effects, 
but they have drawn ambiguous conclusions, partly because the surveillance 
period was less than twenty years, making it difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions about long-term risks to the donors from the data collected.81  
C. Eggs Used for Reproductive Purposes  
In the United States, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is the primary method 
used to assist infertile couples that want to conceive a genetic child.82 In 
vitro fertilization refers to the process of removing eggs from a woman, fer-
tilizing the eggs in the lab, and implanting (or transferring) the resulting 
embryos into the recipient’s uterus several days later.83 The first baby con-
ceived using IVF was born in 1978 in England; three years later, the first 
IVF child in the United States was born in California.84 Since that time, IVF 
utilization has increased rapidly;85 however only a handful of states have any 
legislation explicitly addressing compensation of IVF egg donors.86   
  
cused on the long-term effects of assisted reproductive technologies . . . most IVF protocols 
include luteal phase support for several weeks with supplemental progestogens, which raises 
concern since these agents have been linked in several studies to increase in breast cancer 
risk.’”); see also Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2166 (“To our knowledge, only one study 
has been performed on the rate of serious complications of [OHSS] and oocyte retrieval that 
specifically are experienced by oocyte donors.”). 
 79. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 22–26. 
 80. See id. at 22–28; Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2. 
 81. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e1; Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation for IVF and 
Stem Cell Research: Time to Weigh the Risks to Women’s Health, DIFFERENT TAKES 2 
(Spring 2005), 
http://popdev.hampshire.edu/sites/popdev/files/uploads/dt/DifferenTakes_33.pdf (“One of the 
more serious issues . . . is the absence of any good quality long term safety data on the infer-
tility drugs commonly used. There are hundreds if not thousands of anecdotal reports, where 
complications were NOT short-lived . . . . ‘The FDA says it has not tracked claims of such 
long-term effects.’”(emphasis added)). 
 82. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30 (Spreadsheet of Clinic Tables 
and Data Dictionary). 
 83. “Transfer rate” refers to the number of embryos implanted in a recipient’s womb. 81 
FERTILITY & STERILITY S21, S21–22 (2004). 
 84. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 15, at 41. 
 85. See Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that in 1986, there were only forty-
one IVF clinics in the United States). 
 86. See infra notes 125, 127 and accompanying text. 
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Donor eggs are most commonly used by women who are between thir-
ty-seven and forty-five years of age.87 The likelihood of pregnancy increases 
if more than one egg is transferred, but doing so greatly increases the proba-
bility that multiple infant births88 or other complications may occur.89 Be-
cause ART is expensive and recipients are often limited by the number of 
cycles they can afford, there is substantial pressure on physicians and clinics 
to maximize a recipient’s chance of getting pregnant on the first attempt.90 
This situation suggests that the egg donor’s quality of care may be compro-
mised because the physician’s primary concern is to satisfy his client, the 
recipient; this conflict of interest may make it difficult to simultaneously act 
in the donor’s best interests.91 The conflict of interest is even greater when 
the supervising physician has an ownership interest in the fertility clinic and 
plays an active role in determining compensation and the standard of care 
for egg donors; there is a substantial incentive to cut costs and maximize 
profits.92 
Over the last thirty years, the costs associated with IVF have steadily 
increased as the technology and rate of success have improved.93 Additional-
ly, the cost per IVF cycle is much higher in the United States than other 
countries.94  The average cost of an IVF cycle is $12,400, while the cost of a 
live birth ranges between $66,667 and $114,286.95 Despite this, demand has 
remained high, and continues to increase every year.96 Unlike many other 
developed countries that have adopted publicly funded health care plans that 
cover infertility treatments, the United States does not yet have a compre-
hensive healthcare solution that includes fertility treatments.97 Because few 
  
 87. See 2009 ART Report, supra note 34, at 60–61. 
 88. See id  at 63. 
 89. See id. at 59, 63. 
 90. Marius Meintjes et al., The Balance Between Optimizing Recipient Pregnancy Out-
comes and Aggressive Oocyte Donor Stimulation, 80 FERTILITY & STERILITY S174, S174–75 
(2003). 
 91. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper 
Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 633 (1997). 
 92. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 93. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 229 (2006) (noting that the cost of a live birth born to 
an older woman may be as high as $151,000 to $223,000); see also Nizan Geslevich Packin, 
The Other Side of Health Care Reform: An Analysis of the Missed Opportunity Regarding 
Infertility Treatments, 14 SCHOLAR 1, 20 (2011). 
 94. Mark P. Connolly et al., The Costs and Consequences of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology: An Economic Perspective, 16 HUMAN REPROD. UPDATE 603, 604 (2010) (dis-
cussing the fact that the U.S. performed the largest number of ART cycles in the world but 
has one of the lowest utilization rates). 
 95. See SPAR, supra note 93, at 229. 
 96. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 15, at 43–49. 
 97. See Packin, supra note 93, at 8. 
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healthcare plans cover fertility treatments,98 IVF costs are primarily paid 
out-of-pocket, often making it “too expensive for more than a single try,” 
increasing pressure on the physician or clinic to achieve a successful result.99  
D. Eggs Used for Stem Cell Research 
Stem cell research offers the possibility of providing cures for diseases 
that result from failing organ systems, such as Type I Diabetes and Parkin-
son’s as well as generating replacement tissue through cell-based thera-
pies.100 The majority of extant legislation regarding stem cells deals with 
regulating or restricting human cloning.101 Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer 
(SCNT) is a recently developed human cloning technology, which consumes 
enormous quantities of freshly harvested eggs in the research process.102  
The societal, cultural, and legal resistance to human cloning103 and genetic 
engineering forces researchers to rely upon embryos left over from altruistic 
IVF egg donations.104 However, the “existing demand for reproductive oo-
cytes far outstrips availability,” thus, SCNT research places tremendous 
additional pressure on the global egg market.105  
Eggs are harvested for stem cell research using the same procedure and 
drug protocols as used for IVF purposes;106 however, “prevailing social and 
  
 98. See id. at 21 (“[B]ecause coverage for infertility treatments is much more controver-
sial, in most states there is currently no coverage for infertility treatments at all. Only fifteen 
states mandate insurance coverage for infertility treatments, and specifically, only two states 
require that coverage actually be offered.”). 
 99. See id. at 20–21. 
 100. IOM Report, supra note 4, at 1. 
 101. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.  
 102. See Waldby, supra note 49, at 21; Emily Galpern, Beyond Embryo Politics: Wom-
en’s Health and Dignity in Stem Cell Research, Women’s Health Activist Newsletter, NAT’L 
WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK (Mar./Apr. 2006), http://nwhn.org/beyond-embryo-politics-
womens-health-and-dignity-stem-cell-research (explaining that the “huge number of eggs 
needed and the enormous costs required” make it unfeasible at this time, although scientists 
acknowledge that SCNT is more likely to be used to study diseases at the cellular level”). 
 103. S. Camporesi & G. Boniolo, Fearing a Non-existing Minotaur? The Ethical Chal-
lenges of Research on Cytoplasmic Hybrid Embryos, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 821, 823 (2008) 
(discussing the possibilities of human-animal hybrids and society’s repugnance towards this 
research, but arguing that the severe shortage of human oocytes necessitates using animal 
oocytes which is “an ethically more acceptable alternative”). 
 104. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 7 (“For this research to move forward . . . [it] will 
require a steady supply of stem cells, particularly human embryonic stem cells. . . . Thus 
much of the promise of stem cells depends on women choosing to donate oocytes to the 
research effort.”). 
 105. See Waldby, supra note 49, at 2. 
 106. Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 629 (stating that “[a]n oocyte donor for stem 
cell research is subjected to the same treatment as an oocyte donor in the reproductive setting, 
but the aim of the donation is to advance medical knowledge rather than to establish a preg-
nancy”). Accord Sandra A. Carson, Proposed Oocyte Donation Guidelines for Stem Cell 
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political attitudes impose different standards on eggs” used for reproduction 
as compared to those used for research.107 Whereas “younger women with 
particular backgrounds are almost exclusively sought after” for eggs used 
for reproductive purposes,108 donors for research can be much more diverse 
because “researchers only require that [their] oocytes contain healthy cyto-
plasm.”109 While IVF egg donors receive compensation, with the exception 
of New York, egg donors for research do not.110  
In contrast to eggs used for IVF purposes, which are used to create new 
life, eggs used for human embryonic stem cell research are destroyed when 
the egg’s nucleus is removed to permit the scientist to insert the nucleus of a 
somatic cell into the egg cell, thereby reprogramming it.111 Donors’ reluc-
tance to have their eggs used for research, combined with the vast number of 
eggs required for SCNT, aggravate concerns that researchers or fertility 
physicians will resort to unethical means to obtain the eggs necessary for 
their research.112 These attitudes and beliefs shaped states’ current legisla-
  
Research, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2503, 2505 (2010) (outlining protocols for ovarian 
stimulation). 
 107. Bercovici, supra note 15, at 196; see IOM Report, supra note 4, at 4 (“Research 
donors, for example, are likely to be drawn from a much broader range of women than IVF 
patients, who tend to be primarily Caucasian women in middle to upper socioeconomic 
groups.”); Eric D. Levens & Alan H. DeCherney, Human Oocyte Research: The Ethics of 
Donation and Donor Protection, 300 JAMA 2174, 2175 (2008) (citing Ethics Committee of 
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Compensation of Oocyte Do-
nors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007)). 
 108. See Foohey, supra note 14, at 903. 
 109. Sarah B. Angel, The Value of the Human Egg: An Analysis of Risk and Reward in 
Stem Cell Research, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 183, 198 (2007). 
 110. IOM Report, supra note 4, at XII (“Human embryonic stem cells are currently de-
rived primarily from unwanted or ‘surplus’ (donated) human embryos from patients who 
have undergone treatments for infertility.”); Bercovici, supra note 15, at 197; Ethics Commit-
tee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Informed Consent and the Use of 
Gametes and Embryos for Research, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S251, S251 (2004); see also 
Zacher, supra note 14, at 341. 
 111. Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of 
Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1060–61 
(2006).  
 112. See Waldby, supra note 49, at 10 (discussing discredited Professor Hwang Woo 
Suk’s research in South Korea). Hwang made international headlines in 2004 when his team 
was the first to harvest stem cells from cloned human embryos, but later admitted to using 
several of his junior staff members as egg donors and purchasing human eggs from twenty 
other women in violation of medical ethics standards. Id.; see also Colleen C. Campbell, 
“Supreme Scientist” Superstar: The Hwang Scandal Highlights the Ethical Dangers of 
ESCR, NAT’L REVIEW (Dec. 2, 2005), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216148/supreme-scientist-superstar/colleen-carroll-
campbell (discussing the Hwang scandal and the “research-at-all-costs mentality”). 
 
Many embryonic-stem-cell-research activists . . . discount concerns about the 
demand for eggs leading to ethical breaches and the exploitation of women. Sci-
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tion—most of which prohibits compensation for eggs used for research 
while remaining silent about compensation for IVF donors.113  
The dichotomy demonstrated by existing legislation reflects the contra-
dictory standards applied to eggs used for reproductive purposes (IVF) ver-
sus eggs used for research. Some statutes allow payment for IVF eggs, but 
not for research eggs, while some require strict documentation and tracking 
requirements for research eggs, but have no guidelines for monitoring the 
harvesting and implantation of eggs used in IVF procedures.114  
III. REGULATION OF EGG DONATION AND STEM CELL RESEARCH WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES   
A survey of existing state laws115 regulating the practice of egg dona-
tion, stem cell research, and human cloning within the United States reveals 
a loose patchwork of legislation that, in the majority of states, is unregulat-
ed.116 The lack of legislation in these states creates an environment in which 
unethical brokers, clinics, or providers may operate without any regulatory 
oversight.117 
  
entists can be trusted to comply with agreed-upon professional and government 
standards, they say. Yet when the world’s leading stem-cell researcher admits 
that the frenetic pursuit of promised cures made the temptation to cheat too great, 
they dismiss his behavior as irrelevant to the debate about his research. In fact, 
Hwang’s lies and lapses are a clear illustration of the ethical problems created by 
embryonic-stem-cell research: the immense demand for human eggs that threat-
ens to transform desperately poor women into reluctant egg donors; the risks to 
those women of illness, infertility, and death that may go unmentioned by re-
searchers seeking their eggs; and the dire consequences for a culture that makes a 
commodity of human eggs, human embryos, and human life itself.  
 
Campbell, supra. 
 113. See infra Part III.  
 114. See infra Part III; Fifty State Survey, supra note 5. See also Bercovici, supra note 15, 
at 194. 
 115. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.   
 116. See Helen M. Alvaré, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Chil-
dren’s Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 25 (2003); Bridget M. Fuselier, The 
Trouble with Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket: Using a Property Rights Model to Resolve 
Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 183 (2009) 
(“[W]hile some states ha[ve] made attempts at addressing ethical concerns of ART, there is 
lack of uniformity among states, with many providing little to no regulation.”); Hansen, su-
pra note 18, at 54 (discussing the “crazy quilt of laws” in the United States, which “unlike 
many countries, has no national policies governing assisted reproductive technology”); see 
also Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.   
 117. See supra notes 16–18, 23–24 and accompanying text. 
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A. Overview of Stem Cell Legislation 
Currently, only Georgia, Idaho, and Iowa explicitly permit stem cell re-
search.118 Eighteen states specifically prohibit human cloning, but are silent 
about other types of stem cell research, a reflection of society’s repugnance 
towards this type of research.119 Eleven of these states include a scienter 
requirement, thus preventing criminal prosecution unless a person knowing-
ly or intentionally performs human cloning.120 Two states—Arizona and 
Louisiana—do not prohibit human cloning, but specify that public funds 
shall not be used for SCNT research.121  
B. Overview of Egg Donation Legislation 
A survey of existing legislation on eggs used for reproductive purposes 
demonstrates the wide variety of approaches taken by the states while high-
lighting the substantial disparity in market regulation based upon the intend-
ed use of the eggs.122 Only three states—Georgia, Louisiana, and Oklaho-
ma—expressly prohibit the sale of human eggs for compensation under any 
circumstances.123 While a blanket prohibition on compensation provides 
women the most protection from exploitation, commodification, and long-
term side effects yet to be identified, this approach is politically divisive 
because it puts lawmakers in a Solomon-like position of choosing to protect 
some women while denying others the fundamental right to procreate. The 
fact that only three states have been successful in implementing this ap-
proach attests to the monumental effort needed to overcome this objection. 
States that have attempted to pass similar legislation have failed to gain the 
necessary consensus to enact the proposed law.124 
At the opposite side of the spectrum, Indiana, Florida, and Virginia ex-
plicitly permit compensation and reimbursement of the donor’s expenses for 
egg donation for IVF purposes.125 This broad approach permits “reasonable 
compensation” for the donor’s medical expenses, hospital expenses, travel, 
  
 118. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.  
 119. See id. at Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Virginia.  
 120. See id. at Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. 
 121. See id. at Arizona, and Louisiana. 
 122. See generally supra note 5.  
 123. See id. at Georgia, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. 
 124. See, e.g., H.B. 2907, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011). 
 125. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Florida, Indiana, and Virginia. 
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and recovery time.126 This approach has been criticized for permitting do-
nors to be compensated for their eggs without implementing adequate guide-
lines, such as specifying standards for informed consent and defining rea-
sonable compensation so that courts have a tool to evaluate these transac-
tions. The lack of guidance may encourage egg trafficking, or at the very 
least, induce vulnerable women to donate their eggs without fully under-
standing the risks.127 Fourteen states prohibit egg donation for research pur-
poses but are silent on eggs used for reproductive purposes.128 This approach 
seeks a compromise between prohibiting donor compensation and allowing 
donors to be compensated for reasonable expenses. However, this approach 
provides no guidance to courts, practitioners, clinics, or doctors regarding 
what expenses are considered “reasonable expenses.” The lack of legislation 
also makes it extremely difficult for donors to seek recourse when they ex-
perience complications or serious injuries because the courts have difficulty 
fashioning a remedy without regulatory or legislative guidelines that dictate 
the industry standard that brokers, clinics, and providers must adhere to.129 
Because the donor signs a contract to donate her eggs and consents to the 
extraction procedure, she generally cannot win a suit against the fertility 
provider or clinic unless she has suffered from an egregious error or gross 
misconduct.130 Another problem arises when donors become aware of re-
cently discovered serious side effects or long-term risks of which they were 
not informed of prior to the extraction.131  
  
 126. See id. at Indiana, Florida, and Virginia. Many states use a similar “actual expenses 
incurred” model to compensate surrogates. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman's Worth, 88 
N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1766 (2010).  
 127. See Ruth Macklin, What is Wrong with Commodification, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING 
BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 106, 107–19 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996); Murray, 
supra note 7, at 60–67.  
 128. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, and Virginia. 
 129. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. 2005); see also supra note 23 
and accompanying text. For a review ASRM guidelines, see supra note 24 and accompanying 
text. See also John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction 
Industry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 665, 682 (2007) (“An efficient system of reproductive technology 
needs an infrastructure of legal rules for how technology affects ownership and control of 
gametes and embryos and the rearing rights and duties in the offspring generated by ART.”). 
 130. See supra notes 23, 78 and accompanying text. 
 131. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 22–26; Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2166; 
Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2–e3; Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation for IVF and Stem Cell 
Research: Time to Weigh the Risks to Women’s Health, DIFFERENT TAKES 2 (Spring 2005), 
http://popdev.hampshire.edu/sites/popdev/files/uploads/dt/DifferenTakes_33.pdf (“One of the 
more serious issues . . . is the absence of any good quality long term safety data on the infer-
tility drugs commonly used. There are hundreds if not thousands of anecdotal reports, where 
complications were NOT short-lived. . . . ‘The FDA says it has not tracked claims of such 
long-term effects. . . .’” (emphasis added)). 
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Some states, such as Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Is-
land, prohibit the sale of eggs obtained from human fetuses but do not ad-
dress eggs donated by adult donors.132 This legislation fails to address how 
eggs obtained from sources other than fetuses should be treated and what 
guidelines apply to those transactions. The remaining states either have no 
legislation dealing with selling human eggs for IVF purposes or only prohib-
it human eggs being used for research (human cloning) without addressing 
eggs used for reproductive purposes.133 This absence of legislation leaves the 
field open for unethical providers, brokers, and clinics to operate, while ad-
ditionally failing to provide courts with clear guidelines to evaluate these 
transactions. This is perhaps the most damaging approach for donors, as the 
absence of legislation defining acceptable conduct increases the probability 
that women will be injured or exploited.134    
C. Gaps in Existing Legislation and Suggested Model Approach 
Based on the above overview, it is readily apparent that a wide variety 
of approaches exist within the United States that address stem cell research, 
human cloning, and egg donation for IVF purposes. One state—California—
provides a legislative solution to address eggs used for IVF reproduction, 
human cloning, and stem cell research, while providing donors recourse if 
the legislative guidelines are not adhered to.135 California’s legislation pack-
age is not comprehensive; significant gaps still exist. However, its legisla-
tive approach addresses many of the fundamentals needed to protect both 
donors and recipients from unethical conduct and can provide guidance to 
other states seeking to implement a more comprehensive legislative solution 
in their jurisdictions.  
First, California mandates informed consent, written and oral, prior to 
egg retrieval.136 The statute delineates the format and substance of the con-
sent.137 The statute enumerates disclosure requirements that include “medi-
cally accurate” information detailing the potential risks associated with “the 
surgical procedure and . . . the drugs, medications, and hormones prescribed 
for ovarian stimulation during the AOP [assisted oocyte production] pro-
  
 132. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode 
Island. 
 133. See supra Part III.A; see also Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Arizona, Florida, 
Indiana, Louisiana, and Virginia.  
 134. See supra notes 23, 78 and accompanying text.  
 135. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at California. 
 136. See id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125335 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Legis. Sess.). 
 137. See id. (mandating that providers disclose a “standardized medically accurate written 
summary of health and consumer issues associated with [assisted oocyte production] and any 
alternative methods of oocyte retrieval”). 
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cess,” requiring providers to educate donors about “alternative method[s] of 
oocyte retrieval,” and listing “additional . . . medical information on health 
and safety issues surrounding oocyte retrieval.”138  
However, this statute only addresses eggs used for research, i.e., those 
used “for the purpose of procuring oocytes for research or the development 
of medical therapies,” but does not explicitly require the same consent pro-
cedures for eggs used for reproductive purposes.139 This gap should be 
closed by requiring informed consent for all egg retrievals—regardless of 
the purpose for which the eggs are used.  
Also, unlike Virginia, California does not mandate compliance with 
federal screening requirements for donated reproductive tissue, and, unlike 
New Hampshire, California also does not mandate that potential donors be 
given a general medical evaluation.140 Donors may be unaware that they 
have physiological problems, genetic diseases, or may be predisposed for 
certain diseases.141 This is significant because recipients rely upon providers, 
clinics, and egg broker agencies to screen potential donors for pre-existing 
genetic diseases; thus, failure to mandate testing guidelines could expose 
recipients and their families to the unanticipated risks of having a child with 
a serious medical condition that impacts the child’s quality of life or life 
expectancy.142 Because most courts currently treat human eggs/embryos as a 
good regulated by contract, as opposed to a property interest or a child, this 
suggests that future donors who intentionally misrepresent or hide pre-
existing conditions or diseases may be subject to UCC-based liability, while 
also implying that recipients may have a cause of action against the provider 
or clinic for failure to properly screen potential donors and for lack of in-
formed consent regarding potential risks associated with the eggs implant-
ed.143  
  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.75–.90 (2004) (listing what tests and diseases potential donors 
and donated reproductive material must be screened for); Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.), VA. CODE 
ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). The federal requirements 
have not been enforced against egg brokers or agencies that contract with physicians or fertil-
ity clinics who actually harvest and implant the donated egg. See supra Part I.  
 141. See Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg Donors Liable for La-
tent Genetic Disease?, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 405, 425–57 (2008) (discussing liability issues egg 
donors may encounter).  
 142. Id. at 408. 
 143. See Jayanti, supra note 141, at 435; Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 43–49; see 
generally Levens & DeCherney, supra note 107, at 2175 (discussing informed consent and 
possible negative effects the donor may suffer).  
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Second, California specifically prohibits egg harvesting if the surgeon 
performing the procedure has a financial interest in the outcome.144 This 
conflict of interest provision is important in light of the fact that many re-
searchers have a financial stake in their research.145 Additionally, most cur-
rent statutes fail to address the issue of providers or clinics who have a fi-
nancial interest in egg harvesting for reproductive purposes.146  For this rea-
son, a statute that fails to address this conflict of interest leaves a substantial 
gap because many providers have an ownership interest in the fertility clin-
ics where they practice (and may also have ownership interests in egg dona-
tion or surrogacy agencies to which they refer patients).147 Most physicians 
do not disclose this information to their patients, thus providing “the perfect 
cover for extortion and criminal activity.”148 Requiring all clinics, surgeons, 
and providers to disclose any conflicts of interest or financial interests to 
both the donor and recipient could close this gap. 
Third, California mandates that egg donors who contribute their eggs 
for research purposes may only be compensated for direct expenses, such as 
travel costs, medical expenses, and recovery time.149 Permitting donors to be 
compensated but limiting reimbursement to direct expenses is an excellent 
way to restrict compensation amounts without completely prohibiting egg 
donation.150 However, California does not limit the dollar amount of com-
pensation or provide guidelines for compensating IVF egg donors.151 Cali-
  
 144. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125344 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). 
 145. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The Hwang scandal in South Korea is an 
extreme example of the ethical violations that may occur when this restriction is not express-
ly mandated. California deemed this issue important enough to codify a mandate that re-
searchers have no financial interest in the outcome of their research. See Fifty State Survey, 
supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125344 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. 
Sess.) (The physician or surgeon performing oocyte retrieval shall not have a “financial inter-
est in the outcome of the research.”); see also Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embry-
onic Stem Cell Research, INT’L SOC’Y FOR STEM CELL RES. 5–8 (2006), 
http://www.ite.gr/_gfx/pdf/ISSCRhESCguidelines2006.pdf. 
 146. See CARNEY, supra note 3, at 75 (“There is a clear conflict of interest when doctors 
and brokers are able to play the role of both profit-taking middleman and health-care provid-
er.”); Pam Madsen, Should Infertility Doctors Disclose Conflicts of Interest?, THE FERTILITY 
ADVOCATE (May 29, 2011), http://www.thefertilityadvocate.com/asrm-ethics-
committee/should-infertility-doctors-disclose-conflicts-of-interest/.  
 147. See Lahl, supra note 16 (discussing her observations of the relationships between 
fertility doctors and egg donation agencies or brokers they have a financial interest in). 
 148. See CARNEY, supra note 3, at 75. 
 149. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125355 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). 
 150. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at California. For example, one of the well 
documented cases occurred when an egg broker solicited at Stanford University. The young 
woman, Papademas, was in her PhD program at Stanford when she suffered a stroke a few 
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fornia has more IVF clinics than any other state in the United States and the 
vast majority of donated eggs are used for IVF purposes;152 this leaves a 
significant gap in which bad actors may use compensation to exploit donors. 
As discussed previously, failure to address compensation parameters and set 
forth legislative guidelines for eggs used for research and for reproductive 
purposes increases the probability that women will be exploited or unfairly 
induced to sell their eggs. 
Fourth, California is the only state in the nation to address agencies or 
entities that utilize predatory advertising.153 The guidelines set forth by the 
ASRM Ethics Committee state that “[a]lthough there is no consensus on the 
precise payment that oocyte donors should receive, at this time sums of 
$5,000 or more require justification and sums above $10,000 are not appro-
priate.”154 The reality is that professionals do not adhere to these guidelines, 
as evidenced by many of the advertisements that offer exorbitant compensa-
tion for “exotic” donors that have particular characteristics such as SAT 
scores over 1400, height of 5’7” or more, blond hair, and an Ivy League 
education.155 Thus, legislation that mandates adherence to ASRM guidelines 
is a powerful tool for prosecutors and donors in dealing with unethical bro-
kers and agencies because it provides the donor with a legal recourse while 
giving the courts a “stick” to punish violators.156 
  
days after taking the ovulation stimulation drugs. Egg brokers target Ivy League schools and 
offer $35,000 to $100,000 for these eggs. See Papademas, supra note 23, at *1. 
 152. See 2009 Clinic Tables and Data Dictionary, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ARTReports.htm (last visited Jun. 8, 2012).  
 153. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). Predatory advertising combined with the preva-
lent lack of truly informed consent about the long-term risks of egg harvesting creates a very 
dangerous situation for potential donors, who are often vulnerable women with significant 
financial obligations. See Jennifer J. Black, Egg Donation: Issues & Concerns, 35 AM. J. 
MATERNAL CHILD NURSING 132, 134 (2010) (citing a previous study noting evidence that 
“oocyte donor programs may in fact be minimizing or misrepresenting the existence of risk to 
prospective donors”); Levine, supra note 22, at 27–33 (discussing predatory advertising).  
 154. See Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra 
note 107 at 305, 308.  
 155. Levine, supra note 22, at 27–33 (analyzing advertisements by egg brokers, agencies, 
and individuals and concluding that the majority of the advertisements violate ASRM guide-
lines by offering compensation well above recommended guidelines). Exotic donors, i.e., 
those with high SAT scores, Ivy League educations, and particular physical attributes (blue 
eyes, blond hair, height of 5'7" or more) could be offered as much as fifty to one hundred 
thousand dollars for their eggs, calling “into question the notion that the current self-
regulatory framework provides appropriate ethical protections for oocyte donors.” Id. at 27; 
see also Helen M. Alvaré, supra note 116 at 13–14 (discussing several widely publicized 
advertisements for exotic donors). 
 156. The full power of this tool remains to be seen. There are two class action lawsuits 
pending on this issue in California—the first in the nation. See Brief for Petitioner, Levy v. 
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. C11-03803, 2011 WL 3373300 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011); 
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Fifth, California requires that eggs extracted for research purposes must 
comply with legislative guidelines whether they were procured in-state or 
out-of-state.157 These requirements include keeping a written record of every 
oocyte used for research,158 creating an anonymous registry of embryos 
available for research,159 prohibiting researchers and their immediate family 
members from “being a subject in the research,”160 and requiring that an 
institutional review board (IRB) monitor the research.161 This legislation is 
also important because it implicitly recognizes some of the ethical issues 
that have occurred when researchers have imported eggs from other states or 
other countries to avoid compliance with local regulatory guidelines.162  
Sixth, California implemented several statutes that address the disposi-
tion of oocytes and attempt to honor the donor’s preferences regarding the 
disposition of any unused genetic material.163 This is significant because 
much of the litigation thus far has been related to errors (eggs were de-
stroyed, improperly preserved, or implanted into the wrong person) or mis-
conduct (eggs were intentionally destroyed or shared with multiple recipi-
ents to increase profits without the donor’s knowledge).164 Most importantly, 
California provides a legal recourse and a criminal penalty for providers that 
  
Brief for Petitioner, Kamakahi, v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. CV-11-1781-JCS, 2011 
WL 1374902 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011). These cases were consolidated on March 14, 2012. 
See Kamakahi v. Am. Soc. for Reprod. Med., No. C11-01781 SBA, 2012 WL 892163, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012). 
 157. Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125346 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).  
 158. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125342 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. 
Sess.).  
 159. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125305 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. 
Sess.). 
 160. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125343 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. 
Sess.).   
 161. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125341 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. 
Sess.); see also Int’l Soc’y for Stem Cell Res., Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embry-
onic Stem Cell Research, 5–8 (Dec. 21, 2006), 
http://www.ite.gr/_gfx/pdf/ISSCRhESCguidelines2006.pdf. 
 162. See CARNEY, supra note 3, at 113; Int’l Soc’y for Stem Cell Res., supra note 161, at 
8 (citing the need for institutional review of oocytes procured for research to “ensure that 
vulnerable populations are not exploited due to their dependent status or comprised ability to 
offer fully voluntary consent”). 
 163. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125345 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Legis. Sess.).  
 164. See supra notes 23, 77 and accompanying text. 
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intentionally or knowingly misuse donated reproductive material in express 
violation of the donor’s wishes.165 
Finally, California’s legislation does not address quality control issues, 
which opens up the possibility of consumer exploitation.166 Because IVF 
procedures involve complex technology that often has a low rate of success 
depending on the recipient’s health and various physiological factors, it is 
possible for clinics and practitioners to take advantage of a consumer’s igno-
rance regarding the differences in the quality of treatment, the technology 
available, and the provider’s level of experience.167 Consumers are often 
unaware that the provider’s expertise and the technology used during the 
ART procedure may also be linked to birth defects or other serious health 
issues.168 Additionally, in smaller states such as Arkansas, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, or Idaho, there may only be one fertility clinic 
in the state; thus, there is no competition, much less any oversight that might 
serve to protect consumers.169  
For example, a small fertility practitioner may grade a certain set of 
embryos as “excellent,” while a well-established clinic located in a large 
metropolitan area may grade the same embryos as “fair.”170 This disparity in 
“product quality” combined with the natural opacity of the clinic’s practices 
and available technology increases the likelihood of fraud.171 Because con-
sumers in these circumstances are unaware that the disparity in quality ex-
ists, much less the difference in skill or practical knowledge between clinics, 
they may spend thousands of dollars for a procedure carried out with non-
viable eggs.172 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the initial visceral reaction by many has been to push for a legal 
ban on compensation for egg donors as a means of eliminating exploitation 
or commodification of donors or of human eggs, the fact is that Louisiana is 
the only state to adopt this approach; all other states that have attempted to 
  
 165. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Legis. Sess.). 
 166. See Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 22–25 (discussing the need for establishing 
clear quality control standards).  
 167. See Heled, supra note 15, at 281 (noting that ART consumers are the “least informed 
and least equipped party” to assess the risks in the ART procedure).  
 168. See id. at 277.  
 169. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30, at Spreadsheet of Clinic Ta-
bles and Data Dictionary. 
 170. Interview with Jane Doe, Attorney (Oct. 20, 2011). The interviewee requested that 
her full name be omitted to protect her privacy. 
 171. See Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47. HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 135 (2010). 
 172. See id. 
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adopt similar legislation have not been successful.173 At the other end of the 
spectrum, only three states have been able to pass legislation permitting the 
donor to be compensated for her eggs regardless of the intended purpose.174 
In between these two positions are the states that have no legislation ad-
dressing eggs used for research or IVF purposes, and California’s legislative 
approach, which prohibits compensation for research, but is silent on eggs 
used for IVF purposes.175 At the same time, the federal government has 
shown an unwillingness to impose sweeping legislation on the states, create 
new agencies to regulate this industry, or modify the regulatory authority of 
existing agencies, such as the Federal Drug Administration or the Centers 
for Disease and Prevention Control.176  
The solution to this issue must be multi-faceted and must take into con-
sideration the underlying moral and ethical concerns, balanced by an under-
standing of how the global market for eggs is exerting pressure on the mar-
ket for eggs within the United States.177 A comprehensive legislative pack-
age is needed in each state that addresses eggs used for research and those 
used for IVF purposes, closing the major gaps that unethical actors could 
exploit to their benefit.  
A better alternative would be for each state to allow reasonable com-
pensation for donors of eggs for either purpose, while mandating informed 
consent and full disclosure of known risks from the surgical procedure and 
the drug protocols used.178 States could specify acceptable ranges of com-
pensation and enforce compliance through a statutory mechanism. Federally 
mandated incentives could be applied to encourage states to adopt this ap-
proach.179 Additionally, if a national registry were created for IVF donors, 
like those already being used to monitor embryos used for stem cell re-
search, this would facilitate surveillance efforts by requiring providers and 
clinics to track the disposition of each oocyte utilized and retain donors’ 
medical records, thus aiding researchers attempting to track long-term side 
  
 173. See, e.g., H.B. 2907, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2011). 
 174. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.  
 175. See supra notes 133, 149 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 25 (citing Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing 
the Market for Human Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs but Not 
Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 643, 645–46 (2008) (“With practically every as-
pect of human-to-human tissue transfer in the United States regulated, the lack of regulatory 
control over human egg donation in particular . . . speaks volumes about the acceptance of a 
free market approach to ART.”)).  
 177. See also Waldby, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.  
 179. E.g., S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987) (holding Congress can en-
courage states to adhere to federal regulations by conditioning receipt of federal monies upon 
compliance, which would create uniformity in the states). 
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effects.180 Currently, no records are kept of how many times donors donate 
their eggs.181 Often, clinics do not keep donors’ medical records, making it 
difficult for donors to seek recourse if they experience complications and 
making it impossible for researchers to effectively monitor donors for long-
term side effects such as infertility and increased risk of cancer.182 Finally, 
states should enact legislation prohibiting predatory advertising and mandat-
ing compliance with ASRM recommended guidelines.183 Enacting such leg-
islation would give donors a remedy that the courts could enforce, while 
also protecting young donors who may not realize the risk of cancer and 
other long-term effects are much higher with repetitive donations.184 
If there is no national consensus on how to address this issue, unethical 
entities and providers will continue to take advantage of existing gaps in 
legislation to exploit women.  
V. CONCLUSION 
There are no easy answers to these thorny problems. ART technology 
has existed for over thirty years, yet there is very little legislation enacted to 
protect women from exploitation, indicating that the most common legisla-
tive response to this complex issue is to make no decision in the hopes that 
the problem will resolve itself in time. The ‘bad actors’ that are present in 
any such ill-defined or poorly regulated arenas are currently exploiting the 
lack of regulation, as well as making a lucrative business of performing 
risky procedures on women who are unaware of the long-term dangers to 
their health and fertility. States must take action to address eggs used for 
research and IVF purposes. Only a comprehensive legislative solution has 
any hope of mitigating abuses while giving injured women a legislative re-
course.  
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